Things Get Physicalist: The Cognitive Science Debate

Recently the field of Cognitive Science has become engaged in a heated discussion about whether or not it can or has disproven religion.  Some within the field have noted this as a startlingly recent development stemming from the theories of men like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennet.[1]  While not directly affirming the naturalness of religion or the truth of religion, their indirect arguments have stirred the controversy within the field.[2]  Jesse Bering has quite boldly proclaimed “We’ve got God by the throat, and I’m not going to stop until one of us is dead”.[3]  Clearly there are many within the scientific community who champion this theory.

            This bold theory has pressed forward under the assumption of so called “Physicalism”.  Based on a naturalistic assumption, Physicalism assumes that all that exists is the physical world.[4]  Therefore since the physical world exists in isolation only the natural sciences can lead to truth.  Truth then becomes synonymous with science and “scientific fact” for the Physicalist.[5]

            Strict naturalists espouse three core claims concerning methodology, epistemology and nature itself. Usually Darwinian in nature, natural science methods are demanded to be used in all other sciences as well.  Ontologically it is asserted that “only matter in motion is real[6]”.  It can only be real if it can be measured through the scientific process[7].

This leads to the assumption that physical or material existence alone is provable, and only that which is reducible to physical theory.[8]  Physicalism holds that only science can provide any truth, and therefore has priority over all other types of knowledge.  While most theistic religions cannot tolerate this, certain nontheistic pantheisms fit suitably into this system of beliefs.  For those acknowledging a spiritual reality however, this system is diametrically opposed.

            Within the debate theism is largely assumed to entail two thigs about god and the world.  The theistic god is nonphysical and existing; the pantheist need not have a physical god.  This spiritual god actively works in the physical world, contradicting the naturalist teleology[9]. Having an immaterial god is the source of contention between those favoring physicalism and those against.  The question of whether or not such a god can be measured and the implications for this play form an underlying thread in the debate.

            Any resolutions cannot be by proofs alone.  Resolutions are always filtered, and are therefore dependent on their assumptions.  Cognitive scientists may claim “there is only one religion; there are minor variations at the periphery.”[10]  This displays an underlying assumption through which resolutions are filtered forming and shaping practice and interpretation.  The underlying assumption of cognitive science as a whole is that religious beliefs and experiences are accounted for by the same processes and structures we use for all of life.[11]

            Religion provides a way of making sense of the world.  It provides a perspective of the world and reality and the place of the individual within it.[12]  All religions do one thing functionally; they assess a man’s place in nature and prescribe a path/remedy.[13]  Religion encompasses the private and the public, the individual and institutional, the subjective and the objective elements of reality.  Religion therefore cannot be understood as being merely personal or idiosyncratic.[14]

            Saler Benson finds three characteristics in the study of the cognitive science of religion.  CSR operates on human beings as individuals over religions and cultures.[15]  The common approach likewise affirms that the processes’ and supports used in religion are not exclusive to religion.  These support other aspects of human life distinctive from religious function, both intuitive and counter-intuitive ideas.  Supporters see this approach to cognitive science as applying a realistic and moderately reductive model.[16]

            The Physicalist definition of cognitive science assumes a bottom to top cognitive approach.  Conscious thoughts in this schema are entirely caused by lower level cognitive mechanisms such as input and instinct.  Therefore there is only a bottom up flow of causation.  The lower levels are the unconscious, unthinking realm of human existence.  The sequencializing “A leads to B” is considered largely a teaching tool as the mind is too complex[17].

            This theory would lead to a deterministic interaction and Physicalists like to claim overcoming religion is done by thought (top down) which is not possible in this schema where our beliefs are derived from natural mechanisms.[18]  Emergence of a true consciousness remains an impossibility in a physicalist framework.  A person must fight their baser instincts to change a belief, but is wholly driven by those unconscious influences.[19] 

            Cognitive Science assumes like all experiences, religious practices are cognitively mediated.[20]  Any religious activity would show on a brain scan, if it weren’t so mediated it would be impossible to study scientifically.  Brain scans and lab tests have confirmed this theory. Religious experiences display in activity in the body of the person engaging in the experience.[21]

            Sorensen theorizes that structures of culture and society are domain specific to the world around us.[22]  We have a “schematized structure guiding the expectations of the world, temporal unfolding of events within a domain.[23]  Rituals are considered a rather significant part of this event.  These serve as part of broader cognition and divisions such as agent/non-agent, animate and inanimate distinctions in the world around the mind.[24]  Metaphor exists as the realm of abstraction. Jesper Sorensen classifies ritual within this realm where it engages people to create change.  Ritual serves objective and subjective effects, worshiping the external god and affecting the subject.[25]

            Scott Atran, Pascal Boyer and Justin Barret propose that these mental tools serve to significantly constrain religious beliefs.  Religious beliefs in their estimation are an evolutionary byproduct (the theory of byproductism).  Unintended they prove instead to derive from the brains wiring as it evolved our variety of cognition to survive more effectively[26].  They theorize this arose accidentally but provided benefits such as group cohesion and created a reproductive advantage.[27]  Humans possess an unacknowledged inner mentality wherein religion plays a key role.[28] Historically it has been noted as being a binding quality that creates community.[29] 

            Sorensen supposes that among its benefits the accidental creation of religious cognition would have created a sense of morality, a desirable attribute.  It is interestingly worth noting this does reflect Kant’s observation of religion as “the recognition of all our duties as divine commands”. The theory posits that children would personalize objects, being hyper-vigilant so as to survive any possible threats[30].  Belief in gods and spirits evolved from this and tendencies within children to attach anthropomorphic language to objects.[31]  This “hyper referential system” affecting belief in the divine are theorized to be likewise stimulated by interaction with other material agents.[32]

            Studies of children with this theory have confirmed the interesting presence of the universality of a concept of god in children.[33]  Scientists studying the field have long noted that religious ideas come to children naturally and display always even when raised atheistically.[34]  Infants as young as five-months old display what appears to be perception of agency.  This promiscuous teleology found within children can only be overcome with education.  While this assumes older generations were identical with our own, there exists also the possibility from history and this study that older generations did not possess a natural/supernatural dichotomy.[35]  Based on these studies the theory holds large sway and appears to have worked out pragmatic results of human religious cognition.

            Religion also displays an ability to meet the emotional needs of individuals.  Religious belief may serve a compensatory function emotionally when other people don’t provide or offer what an individual’s felt needs are.[36] When a person is flourishing in other areas religiosity can act positively in correlation.[37]  A good life can cause an individual to feel thankful to a God and more religious.  So according to Pruyser, religion can be conceived of as “at-one-ment” in the sense of alignment and attuning to the divine not union.[38]

            In practice ritual has been theorized by Pascal Boyer to use repetition of words to increase effectiveness, as magic or to gain favor.[39]  Boyer states that originally this would be ritual from priests or other religious specialists using their voicing and posturing.  Eventually audiences became participants and call/response was added to ritual and liturgy.  The question is raised, are rituals a result not a cause of representation as Boyer posits?  Boyer’s theory assumes it is not in our genetics but that religion is a learned behavior through ritual.[40]  Sorensen posits that cultural models and even framing narrative are based entirely on human experiences. Paul Pruyser notes rituals like confession can serve to create human and divine contact to bring relief and free the conscience.[41]

Structures of culture and society tie to group cohesion.  According to Sorensen these possess a schematized structure that individuals use to understand the whole world.[42]

The effects of religion as group cohesion and the modern world have interestingly displayed themselves in contemporary church decline.  Since the 1950’s in America church attendance has declined significantly, "with a Gallup poll declaring “believing is becoming increasingly divorced from belonging.[43]  It is notably worse in England and Holland where Church attendance is only 5% any given week.  Likewise a majority of Catholic Italians disagree with the Pope.  This has been an outworking of old ties but also the distinctness today of spirituality from religion in the “spiritual but not religious” movement.[44]  It seems that for all the religionlessness religious belief itself remains inescapable.

            Religion has been shown to provide significant benefits and possesses genetic rooting.  In study there has been shown a strong association between vat2 polymorphism and feelings of “self-transcendence” for those with a C in their DNA in one or both chromosomes.[45] This creates a feeling of transcendence and oneness with the universe, and with the loving nature of God.  While occurring more in females the results are the same in males.[46]

            Michael Persinger set about on what is now the “Persinger experiment” when accidentally stimulating the “God spot” on his brain.  In making the temperal proprietal region of the brain fire, he and later subjects were able to experience a “God high”.  When temporal lobe epileptics were exposed to religious imagery and words, this region of the brain spiked[47]. 

            The 6 year study of Piedmont North Carolina study has shown personal benefits as well.  3968 adults were examined between 1986-92[48] and of those attending less than once a week, 37% died in that time frame.  Only 23% attending at least once or more died.[49]  Those that never went to Church in a related study had a 50% increased mortality rate even with all possible demographic factors accounted for.[50]

            Religion does personally create a consciousness and concept of one’s self.  Pruyser asserts self-concept contrasts with the other and the beyond, differentiating us from other peopled and the world beyond us.[51] God or the deity becomes defined as the wholly other “das ganz andere” under a creator/creature distinction.  Pruyser may here assume the Judeo-Christian worldview, but the concept of self as distinct appears in all religions.  Eastern religions differ where “God is all” is the central focus and assertion ye the self is distinct and needing of reunion with the all.  Religion evaluates the self, tests the self and provides a course for molding oneself universally.[52]

            Contrary to evidence, Dawkins asserts that genetics have nothing to do with spiritual belief.  Rather they are a “virus of the mind” and serve no purpose or advantage.[53]  He appears to concur with the belief of Sorensen that religion is wholly taught with no internal inclination.  His influence over science is unfortunate, but one can understand his wishful thinking and his objection predicates itself on the knowledge of many of the same issues that kill Physicalism.

            It is a largely ignored reality that not just “religious” but Physicalists approach reality with a contextual background of assumptions. Specific explanations perform their own functions; physics has a different focus than biology.  All explanations of any field perform specific functions and are only convincing in the given field they are a part of.  The axioms and assumptions on which a theory depends cannot be demonstrated within that field.[54]  Demanding proof/warrant results in an infinite regress.

            Proof and faith are actually opposite sides of the same coin.  They are not opposing each other ontologically as James Jones notes, in reality without believing something we can’t make any proofs.  Rationalism’s goal is to satisfy our own minds that our beliefs are rational[55] but this is impossible to do without faith.  Proving this does not remove belief rather it requires it.[56]  More often than not, the issue with evidence is interpretation.[57]  To put it another way, trust and thought are impossible to separate.

            Physicalism carries the assumption that explaining the origin of the belief makes continued belief unjustified.  This assumes that if religion is true it must have no natural cause.[58]  Cognitive science really deals with function, how things work.[59]  Likewise disproving “parts” that aren’t even universal like Goblins/Ghosts wouldn’t disprove the whole of religion.

            Jones notes the existence of the assumption of a bottom up instinct in Physicalism.   Instincts and subconscious biological wiring is assumed to filter up into the conscious mind and action. People possess a conscious mind that acts on their instincts, making this demonstrably false and leading in Physicalism to chemical determinism. Jones finds on this basis that if it were true the mind doing the science could not be trusted.[60]  If this were true then the scientist is merely firing chemicals.

            Saler proposes a solution by defining worldview as set of propositions for the world.  He places a primary precept as “A”, that which is undeniable for the sustainability of a belief.  “B” is that which is not necessary.  For a theist A is God, for Atheists A would be there is no God.  B is God did this, the supernatural exists.  Theory can be neutral if it doesn’t address/ suppose an “A” claim.  So a neutral theory is possible.  IT must be noted that B is always founded on A, so in itself it may be neutral but it predicates itself on a founding belief meaning true neutrality is not possible for an observer.

            Jones notes the issue is one of framework.  Science and religion have different focuses on different experiences. Religion he claims is helpful in making sense of experiences beyond ourselves and giving us meaning, morality, answers and the sacredness of personhood.  There exists between science and religion a degree of compartmentalization as Stephen Jay Gould says “non-overlapping magisterial” division as each is totally separate in every way.[61]  Often, scientists of the physicalist persuasion go beyond scientific data in doing science.

            There is only conflict if a person is committed to an “epistemological zero sum game, in which there is only one single valid way to see the world.[62]  If religion and science perform the same functions answering the same questions then there will naturally be disagreement.  Likewise “science” is not neutral as it has arisen in its own culture and biological context so it functions not as an unbiased observer.

            I agree largely with Jones’ assessment of the serious issues of Physicalism’s assumptions.  He understands very thoroughly by experience and knowledge in the field the assumptions of his compatriots.  The assumptions of the Physicalist are unsubstantiated and unprovable as Jones suggests.  My main point of disagreement may be one more of definition or absence.  Jones is addressing fields of study it would appear.  As such his division between religion and science works.  Religious practice and divine revelation have different focuses and intentions than the field of natural science.

            He does not define religion as anything other than a practice.  This does make sense in light of the discussion being of study and evidential concerns.  However religion is far more than these things.  Religion must be defined as the fundamental framework for all of life, the belief and trusted system by which we do make sense of the world.  A person finds no meaning and makes no sense of themselves and the world around them without religion. For the Christian this means seeing the world as God ordered, a contribution that made science largely possible.  One cannot leave his religion at the door when he engages in science or one must ask whether he really believes it.

Physicalism appears as the natural ends of enlightenment philosophy.  Its base assumption is the logical positivist notion of knowledge.  Only what can be tested by passing through the material is real, anything else is nonsense.  By my given definition, this is why Physicalism functions as a religion all its own taking Darwinian method and applying it to all things.[63]  Religiously, Physicalists believe constant advancement of man from the primitive state to our current “enlightened” mindset.  This is accomplished by reason, reason does so through science and this is largely assumed the “neutral and factual” unbiased observer which Jones rightly rejects.  Theories are at best “suggestions of what has been observed, or suggested groupings of facts.”[64]

While Psychology itself is not an evil, the anti-religious bias was present early.  Freud insisted religion itself was an infantile regression from maturity.[65] Freud in speaking on religion noted an assumption that a feeling of insignificance in relation to the universe was typically religious said ““He who goes no further, he who humbly acquiesces in the insignificant part man plays in the universe, is on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word”.  Freud assumes that it is possible to be without religious belief, something that contemporary studies make hard if not impossible to stand by.

            Dawkins seems to understand that if the brain is wired by evolutionary development to have religion which is a lie he can’t trust evolution or his own mind.  If it was wired by God he can’t escape that God exists and must admit he is stifling a natural part of his biology.  If religion is a cruel trick of evolution he can’t trust anything.  Barbara Herrnstein Sith notes the new naturalism is “highly speculative, impoverished but not necessarily wrong”[66].  Frankly it is plainly wrong.

It is also worth noting this follows Hume's assumptions concerning miracles.  Those believing them are to be doubted on the basis of intelligence, sophistication, and are in other ways gullible.  Further he assumed that the sheer number of separate religions makes them cancel each other out.  Hume's view of the miraculous, and then religion as primitive contributes to the assumption it must be a remnant of a lesser and more primitive time in human evolution.

Men like Dawkins and the Physicalists quite plainly assume that explaining the mechanism explains away the mechanist.  This is assumed because they assume a God of the gaps. They’re assuming that religion derives from a primitive mind explaining what it can’t understand.  Here we can return to Paley’s watchmaker.  If a person finds a watch they assume a personage, more so explaining the watches mechanics doesn’t explain away a mechanist.

Rather it argues for him and it is far more reasonable to assume a mind behind the mechanism.  The universality of religion further demonstrates an innate mechanism wired by a mechanist. This more consistently fits into a religious framework where we can account for this as a function that drives us to God who created us.  Explaining why some people are more religious than others doesn’t explain away the truth of religion or a supernatural agent behind it.

  Christianity has long accounted for this as Paul declares in Romans 1.  Quite evidently, the Physicalist demonstrates the desire to “not keep God in their knowledge:  Science cannot explain away religion, but demonstrates the logical assumption in a God.  Rather than being an enemy of religion, science mounts evidence for God that is wholly illogical to reject or interpret otherwise.  Likewise the Judeo-Christian concept of God as lawgiver and of creation made modern science doable.[67]  Miracles were miracles because they demonstrated God acting upon the natural laws he established, much like a human moving a cup goes against what the laws of nature otherwise dictate.  Science actually lends itself to natural theology and with it the belief in God.  But as always, it is a matter of the heart of man.

Bibliography

Jones, James.  Can Science Explain Religion? The Cognitive science debate.  New York: Oxford University press, 2016.

Pruyser, Paul W.  A Dynamic Psychology of Religion.  New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968.

Oates, Wayne E.  The Psychology of Religion, Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1973.

Thouless, Robert H.  An Introduction to the psychology of Religion.  New York: The Macmillian Company, 1923.

Tayler, R.O.P. Does Science Leave Room for God?  Nashville, Tennessee: Cokesbury Press, 1933.

Hamer, Dean.  The God Gene.  New York:Doubleday, 2003.
            David Leech and Aku Visala, “The Cognitive Science of Religion: Implications for Theism?” Zygon. 46, no.1 (March 2011), 47-64.

Purvis, Joseph E. “Dealing with the brain in Social Science: Rethinking Cognitive Theory Approaches to Religion through the Work of Boyer, Whitehouse and Sorensen,”Religious Studies Review. 39, no. 2  (June 2013) 65-71.

Saler, Benson, “The Cognitive Sience of Religion.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22 (2010), 330-339.

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[1] David Leech and Aku Visala, “The Cognitive science of religion”, Zygon, vol. 46, no.1 (March 2011),  47.

[2] Leech and Visala, “Cognitive Science,” 47.

[3]James Jones, Can science Explain Religion? The Cognitive science debate, (New York, NY:Oxford University press, 2016 ), 1.

[4] Leech and Visala “Cognitive Science,” 3.

[5] Jones, Can Science, 10.

[6] Leech and Visala “Cognitive Science,” 53.

[7] Leech and Visala “Cognitive Science,” 53.

[8] Leech and Visala “Cognitive Science”, 53.

[9] Leech and Visala “Cognitive Science”, 53.

[10]Jones, Can science, 12.

[11] Jones, Can Science, 14.

[12] Paul W.Pruyser, A dynamic Psychology of Religion (New York, NY:Harper and Row Publishers, 1968) 329.

[13]Pruyser, Dynamic Psychology, 331.

[14]Pruyser, Dynamic Psychology, 331.

[15]Benson, Saler, “The Cognitive Science of Religion” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22, (2010): 334.

[16] Benson, “The Cognitive Science”, 53.

[17] Wayne E. Oates, The Psychology of Religion, (Waco: Texas: Word Books, 1973) 60.

[18] Jones, Can science, 141.

[19] Jones, Can Science, 143.

[20] Jones, Can science, 24.

[21] Jones, Can Science, 25.

[22] Joseph E Purvis,” Dealing with the Brain in Social science: Rethinking Cognitive Theory Approaches to Religion through the Work of Boyer, Whitehouse, and Sorensen” Religious Studies Review 3, no 2. June 2014)  69

[23] Purvis “Dealing with the Brain,” 68.

[24] Purvis “Dealing with the Brain,” 68.

[25] Robert H. Thouless, An introduction to the Psychology of Religion (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1923) 161.

[26] Purvis “Dealing with the brain,” 68.

[27] Jones, Can Science, 27.

[28] Robert H. Thouless, An introduction, 141.

[29]Wayne E. Oates, The Psychology of Religion, 21.

[30] Jones, Can Science, 31.

[31] Purvis “Dealing with the Brian” 66.

[32] Purvis  “Dealing with the Brain” 66.

[33]Jones, Can Science, 29.

[34] Jones, Can Science, 31.

[35] Jones, Can Science, 40.

[36]Pruyser , Dynamics Psychology 224.

[37]Pruyser, Dynamics Psychology, 224.

[38]Pruyser, Dynamics Psychology, 227.

[39] Pruyser, Dynamic Psychology, 133.

[40] Purvis “Dealing with the Brain,” 66

[41] Pruyser, Dynamic psychology. 136.

[42] Purvis “Dealing with the Brain,” 69

[43]Dean Hamer, The God Gene (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 5

[44] Hamer, The God Gene, 5.

[45] Hamer, The God Gene, 73.

[46] Hamer, The God Gene, 74.

[47] Hamer, The God Gene, 135.

[48] Hamer, The God Gene, 146.

[49] Hamer, The God Gene, 146.

[50] Hamer, The God Gene, 146.

[51] Pruyser, Dynamic Psychology 287.

[52] Pruyser, Dynamic Psychology, 293.

[53] Hamer, The God Gene, 143.

[54] Jones, Can Science, 44.

[55] Thouless, Introduction, 83.

[56] Jones, Can Science, 45.

[57] Jones, Can Science,57.

[58] Jones, Can Science, 77.

[59] Jones, Can Science,84.

[60] Jones, Can Science, 36.

[61] Jones, Can Science, 185.

[62] Jones, Can science, 185.

[63] Jones, Can science, 116.

[64] R.O.P Taylor, Does Science Leave Room for God? (Nashville, Tennessee: Cokesbury Press (1933), 15.

[65] ,Oates, The Psychology of Religion, 47.

[66] Saler, “Theory and Criticism” 338.

[67] Taylor, Does science, 70.